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Abstract
This paper uses a large vector autoregression to measure international macroeconomic
uncertainty and its e↵ects on major economies. We provide evidence of significant com-
monality in macroeconomic volatility, with one common factor driving strong comovement
across economies and variables. We measure uncertainty and its e↵ects with a large model
in which the error volatilities feature a factor structure containing time-varying global com-
ponents and idiosyncratic components. Global uncertainty contemporaneously a↵ects both
the levels and volatilities of the included variables. Our new estimates of international
macroeconomic uncertainty indicate that surprise increases in uncertainty reduce output
and stock prices, adversely a↵ect labor market conditions, and in some economies lead to
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal analysis of Bloom (2009), a large body of research has examined the mea-
surement of macroeconomic uncertainty and its e↵ects. Bloom (2014) surveys related work up
through several years ago. Additional recent contributions include, among others, Baker, Bloom
and Davis (2016), Basu and Bundick (2017), Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Groshenny (2014),
Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018, 2019), Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014), Jurado,
Ludvigson, and Ng (2015), Leduc and Liu (2016), and Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2019).
Although much of the literature has focused on uncertainty within a single economy, some
work has examined common international aspects of uncertainty and its e↵ects. Among studies
of economic models, Gourio, Siemer, and Verdelhan (2013) develop an international real busi-
ness cycle model in which an increase in the probability of disaster leads to a decline in GDP,
investment, and employment, with larger e↵ects on the economy that would be more a↵ected
by the disaster. After developing economic evidence of international comovement in volatili-
ties (discussed in more detail below, in a separate section on empirical evidence), Mumtaz and
Theodoridis (2017) build a two-economy, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
in which cross-country risk sharing (for consumption smoothing) and trade openness help to
drive such comovement of volatilities. Cross, Kam, and Poon (2018) develop a two-economy
DSGE model in which level and volatility shocks can have real e↵ects.
Other studies take a comparative international perspective, while not allowing for cross-
country interactions. For example, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, Rubio-Ramı´rez,
and Uribe (2011) focus on the e↵ects of changes in the stochastic volatility of the real interest
rate in small EMEs. After estimating the volatility process, they insert it in a small open economy
DSGE model, and obtain that a increase in the real interest rate volatility leads to a decrease in
output, consumption, investment, hours, and debt.
Extending prior empirical work on international aspects of uncertainty (as detailed below),
in this paper we use large Bayesian vector autoregressions (BVARs) to measure international
macroeconomic uncertainty and its e↵ects on major economies. We do so for two datasets,
one consisting of GDP growth for 19 industrialized economies and the other comprised of 67
variables in quarterly data for the U.S., euro area (E.A.), and U.K. We first use basic factor
model diagnostics to assess the common factor structure of the stochastic volatilities of BVARs.
Then, to estimate global uncertainty and its e↵ects, we turn to our preferred large, heteroskedastic
VAR in which the error volatilities evolve over time according to a factor structure, as developed
in the U.S.-only analysis of Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018). The volatility of each variable
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in the system reflects time-varying common (global) components and idiosyncratic components.
In this model, global uncertainty is allowed to contemporaneously a↵ect the macroeconomies
of the included nations — both the levels and volatilities of the included variables. Changes
in the common components of the volatilities of the VAR’s variables provide contemporaneous,
identifying information on uncertainty. Uncertainty and its e↵ects are estimated in a single step
within the same model.
Our results point to significant commonality in international macroeconomic volatility, with
one common factor — our measure of global uncertainty — accounting for strong comovement
across economies and variables in each of our datasets. Our global uncertainty measure is strongly
correlated with a comparable measure for the U.S. from Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018)
and to a modestly lesser extent with the Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) estimate of U.S.
macroeconomic uncertainty. This suggests that global macroeconomic uncertainty is closely re-
lated to uncertainty in the U.S., which might not seem surprising given the tie of the international
economy to the U.S. economy. Our estimate of global macroeconomic uncertainty appears to
be more modestly correlated with estimates of financial uncertainty from the literature and the
global economic policy uncertainty measure of Davis (2016).
Our results also include impulse response functions for a surprise increase in global macroe-
conomic uncertainty. According to these estimates, a shock to global uncertainty reduces GDP
in most industrialized countries. In the larger set of indicators for the U.S., E.A., and U.K., the
surprise increase in uncertainty lowers GDP and many of its components, adversely a↵ects labor
market conditions, lowers stock prices, and in some economies leads to an easing of monetary
policy. Our identified global uncertainty shock is uncorrelated with other structural (U.S.-based)
shocks, such as productivity, fiscal, or monetary shocks. Hence, the responses are capturing a
genuine e↵ect from unexpected increases in uncertainty.
Historical decomposition estimates for the 19-country GDP dataset indicate that, while shocks
to uncertainty can have noticeable e↵ects on GDP growth in many countries, on balance they are
not a primary driver of fluctuations in macroeconomic and financial variables. For example, over
the period of the Great Recession and subsequent recovery, shocks to uncertainty made modest
contributions to the paths of GDP growth in many countries (e.g., U.S., France, Spain, and
Sweden) and small contributions in some countries (e.g., Japan and Norway). In the declines of
GDP growth observed in a number of countries in the early 1990s and early 2000s, uncertainty
shocks made small contributions in some countries (e.g., U.S., Sweden, and U.K.). Overall,
shocks to the VAR’s variables played a much larger role than did uncertainty shocks. However,
there is a sense in which that is a natural result of considering the VAR shocks jointly as a set
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versus the uncertainty shock by itself; individually, some or many of the VAR shocks would also
play small or modest roles.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews related empirical literature and explains
our contributions. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 uses basic factor model diagnostics to
assess the global factor structure in macroeconomic volatility. Section 5 introduces our preferred
large BVAR model for measuring uncertainty and its e↵ects and then presents results. Section
6 describes some robustness checks. Section 7 summarizes our main findings. The supplemental
appendix details the estimation algorithm and priors and provides additional results.
2 Relationship to Prior Work
To make clear our contributions, in this section we first briefly summarize the most closely
related empirical studies of common international aspects of uncertainty and its e↵ects. We then
detail key di↵erences in our analysis compared to the most closely related prior work. In broad
terms, our work extends the literature by a combination of the use of a large dataset for each
economy considered, the inclusion of uncertainty (volatility factors) in the conditional mean of
the VAR, and the joint, one-step estimation of uncertainty and its first-moment macroeconomic
e↵ects. Our approach also di↵ers from some others in that our uncertainty measure is a common
factor in macroeconomic volatilities, whereas in some research uncertainty is measured with the
volatility of common factors in the business cycle (i.e., factors in first moments).
In a dataset of 243 variables for 11 industrialized countries, Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017)
apply a factor model with stochastic volatility components common to the world and each coun-
try. They find the global component to be an important driver of time-varying volatility. Using
GDP growth for 20 countries, Berger, Grabert, and Kempa (2016) estimate a factor model with
stochastic volatility components common to the world and specific to each country; in a second
step, for each country, they estimate VARs with other variables and uncertainty to assess the
e↵ects of uncertainty. Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes (2013) and Gourio, Siemer, and Verdel-
han (2013) also use simple, small VAR approaches, measuring uncertainty with the volatility
of stock returns. Using 45 variables for G-7 nations, Cuaresma, Huber, and Onorante (2017)
apply a VAR with common factors in shocks that have a time-varying variance represented with
stochastic volatility. Their estimates yield a common factor that is closely tied to the volatility
of global equity prices, and shocks to that factor have significant macroeconomic and financial
e↵ects. Cross, Hou, and Poon (2018) use a VAR with common stochastic volatility in mean to
estimate the e↵ects of domestic and international uncertainty in three small open economies,
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finding that international uncertainty spillovers have important e↵ects in all countries.
Some other analyses have assessed international comovement in financial uncertainty. Using
data on realized stock return volatility and GDP growth in 33 countries, Cesa-Bianchi, Pesaran,
and Rebucci (2019) show that return volatility is much more correlated across countries than is
GDP growth, that global growth has a sizable contemporaneous impact on financial volatility,
and that a common factor accounts for the bulk of the correlation between return volatility
and growth. Casarin, Foroni, Marcellino, and Ravazzolo (2018) propose a Bayesian panel model
for mixed frequency data, with random e↵ects and parameters changing over time according
to a Markov process, to study the e↵ects of macroeconomic and financial uncertainty on a set
of 11 macroeconomic variables per country, for a set of countries including the U.S., several
European countries, and Japan. In their analysis, macroeconomic uncertainty is measured by
the cross-sectional dispersion in survey forecasts of GDP growth, and financial uncertainty is
measured by the VIX for the U.S. They find that, for most of the variables, financial uncertainty
dominates macroeconomic uncertainty, and the e↵ects of uncertainty di↵er depending on whether
the economy is in a contraction or expansion regime.
Other research has focused on the international transmission of policy uncertainty.1 From a
nonlinear (smooth transition) VAR, Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Figueres (2019) find significant
asymmetries, with Canadian (and U.K.) unemployment increasing after a U.S. uncertainty shock
in recessions but not expansions. Their interpretation of the results is that higher U.S. policy
uncertainty leads to higher uncertainty in Canada and the U.K., and this in turn a↵ects economic
activity. Belke and Osowski (2019) compare the transmission of U.S. and E.A. policy uncertainty
using a large-scale FAVAR model with data for 18 OECD countries. Their results are broadly
in line with those of Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Figueres (2019), in the sense that the e↵ects
of both U.S. and E.A. uncertainty shocks are generally negative on all countries, with stronger
e↵ects for the former than for the latter, and with uncertainty shocks originating in one country
quickly increasing uncertainty in the other countries.
As to the relationship of our paper to prior studies focused on macroeconomic uncertainty
related to time-varying second moments, our model is closely related to that developed in the
U.S.-only analysis of Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018). In this paper, we exploit the flexi-
1Bhattarai, Chatterjee, and Park (2019) examine the transmission of U.S. uncertainty as measured with the
VIX to emerging market economies, finding significant e↵ects with some heterogeneity across countries tied to
di↵erences in monetary policy responses. Still other studies have examined other global aspects of uncertainty with
network-based approaches: Klossner and Sekkel (2014) find evidence of significant spillovers of policy uncertainty
from one advanced economy to policy uncertainty in another, and Rossi and Sekhposyan (2017) find spillovers of
macroeconomic uncertainty among Euro area countries.
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bility of the underlying framework of our earlier work to adjust it to fit our international context.
For example, as detailed below, in our two factor implementation, only one (this paper) rather
than both factors (earlier paper) enter the conditional mean, and the idiosyncratic components
are constant (this paper) rather than time-varying (earlier paper). This paper’s primary con-
tribution is empirical, adapting our previous U.S.-only framework to assess the commonality in
macroeconomic uncertainty across countries and its e↵ects on major economies.
As a general matter, we believe that our approach and analysis has some possible advantages
over some prior work on international uncertainty by allowing and making use of more variables
per country. In the existing studies that have assessed the e↵ects of uncertainty on macroe-
conomic fluctuations across countries, uncertainty has commonly been measured and assessed
using a small set of variables for each country. For example, Berger, Grabert, and Kempa (2016)
assess the e↵ects of uncertainty using seven variables per country, and Cross, Hou, and Poon
(2018) use three variables per economy, pairing one large economy with one small economy. In
our larger data set, we have roughly 25 variables for each of the U.S. and E.A. Other work
in the uncertainty literature, including Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) and Carriero, Clark,
and Marcellino (2018), has emphasized some benefits to using relatively large cross sections. In
particular, the use of small VAR models to assess the e↵ects of uncertainty can make the results
subject to the common omitted variable bias and non-fundamentalness of the errors, and it can
assess uncertainty’s impacts on only a small number of economic indicators.
More specifically, as regards the relationship of our paper to Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017)
and Cuaresma, Huber, and Onorante (2017), we believe our paper provides a more direct assess-
ment of the macroeconomic e↵ects of uncertainty (as typically formulated in the literature, such
as in Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng 2015). The Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017) model has com-
mon factors in macroeconomic data, with stochastic volatility in the factor innovations driven
by common factors in volatilities. In their setup, the common volatility factors, which we would
view as aggregate uncertainty, are not in the conditional mean of the factor model (i.e., the levels
of the data). They go on to assess the role of the international volatility factors in fluctuations
in second moments, but not first moments. We instead focus on the typical issue in the single-
country uncertainty literature: the e↵ects of volatility factors (uncertainty) on first moments.
To that end, we include uncertainty in the conditional mean of the model and conduct impulse
response analysis not possible in the Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017) framework. Put another
way, our contribution is to answer a question about e↵ects of uncertainty on business cycle (first
moment) fluctuations not addressable with the Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017) model. If the
goal were a narrower one of only estimating global economic uncertainty, it would not be essential
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to include the first moment link of our model. Unreported comparisons to a version of our model
without the first moment e↵ects indicate that, while the first moment link clearly a↵ects and
informs the estimate of uncertainty, the restricted estimate of global uncertainty is significantly
correlated with our baseline estimate.
Cuaresma, Huber, and Onorante (2017) use a VAR coupled with a factor model of the VAR’s
innovations. Innovations to the factor have stochastic volatility. However, the time-varying
variance does not enter the conditional mean of the VAR. Rather, the factor in the VAR’s first-
moment errors appears to be treated as the measure of risk and uncertainty. By assumption, this
shock to first moments is uncorrelated with innovations to second moments (that is, innovations
to the volatility process). In this sense, their results may confound first-moment shocks with
second-moment changes. In the broader uncertainty literature (e.g., Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng
2015), it is more common to define an uncertainty shock by a shock to second moments. Our
paper follows this tradition, defining uncertainty as a common factor in forecast error variances
that can have first-moment e↵ects (i.e., appears in the VAR’s conditional mean).
One other di↵erence between our paper and a number of others in the international literature
is that we focus on large economies whereas others focus on small advanced or emerging market
economies. As examples, Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes (2013) focus on the e↵ects of uncer-
tainty on emerging market economies, and Cross, Hou, and Poon (2018) concentrate on small
advanced economies.
While our paper shares with Berger, Grabert, and Kempa (2016) the focus on e↵ects of shocks
to macroeconomic uncertainty as most commonly conceived, we believe our approach o↵ers a
couple of advantages. One, as noted above, is that we consider a larger dataset (in part of
our results; we also consider a GDP-only dataset, as do they). The other is that our approach
assesses uncertainty and its e↵ects with an internally-consistent one-step approach, rather than
the two-step approach used in Berger, Grabert, and Kempa (2016) and common in other studies
in the uncertainty literature. In the two-step approach, a measure of uncertainty is estimated
in a preliminary step and then used as if it were observable data in the subsequent econometric
analysis of its impact on macroeconomic variables. However, as described in Carriero, Clark, and
Marcellino (2018), with such a two-step approach, it is possible that measurement error in the
uncertainty estimate could lead to endogeneity bias in estimates of uncertainty’s e↵ects, and the
uncertainty around the uncertainty estimate is not easily accounted for in such a setup, since the
proxy for uncertainty is treated as data. Moreover, the models used in the first and second steps
are somewhat contradictory, with the first step treating second moments as time-varying and the
second treating them as constant over time. As our results below show, the two-step approach
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tends to overestimate the precision of impulse response estimates compared to our preferred one-
step approach that accounts for uncertainty around the measure of macroeconomic uncertainty.
We acknowledge, however, a tradeo↵ with respect to potential model misspecification: were
our preferred model to su ciently mis-specify the uncertainty process and its link to economic
conditions, it might yield estimates of uncertainty and its e↵ects more biased than could be
obtained with a two-step approach.
One final matter is the concept of uncertainty. The uncertainty literature features a range of
both concepts and measures, described in Bloom (2014). Some studies (e.g., Basu and Bundick
2017 and Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Groshenny 2014) use stock volatility-based measures,
whereas others (e.g., Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2016 and Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Figueres
2019) rely on measures uncertainty associated with economic policies, based on newspaper cov-
erage. Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) argue for defining and measuring uncertainty with
forecast error variances. Rossi, Sekhposyan, and Soupre (2018) provide additional discussion of
alternative concepts and measures, including a distinction between ex post and ex ante discussion.
The measures of uncertainty we use in this paper are based on the concept of Jurado, Ludvigson,
and Ng (2015), and below we will discuss their correlation with some of the alternatives.
3 Data
As indicated above, we rely on two datasets, one consisting of GDP growth rates for a relatively
large set of industrialized economies and the other consisting of a larger set of macroeconomic
variables for three large economies. Although the first dataset is similar to others in the literature
and helps to establish an international factor structure to uncertainty, our greater interest is in
the second dataset because it includes relatively large variable sets for each economy.
More specifically, for the GDP growth analysis, we use quarterly data on GDP in 19 indus-
trialized economies, obtained from the OECD’s online database (OECD 2017); Table 1 provides
the country list. This country set is the same as that in Berger, Grabert, and Kempa (2016),
except that we omit New Zealand due to data missing early in our sample. Although we could
include more countries in this sample, we don’t do so partly out of consideration of model stabil-
ity. Instabilities seem likely to increase with larger cross-sections of countries, due to di↵erences
over time or across countries in economic development.
For the analysis of a wider set of macroeconomic indicators across industrialized economies,
long time series on large variable sets are di cult to find. Accordingly, we focus on a few major
economies for which relatively large sets of long time series are available: the U.S., euro area,
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and U.K. For the U.S. and E.A., we obtain quarterly data on major macroeconomic indicators
from the files of Jarocinski and Mackowiak (2017). After omitting their series with missing data
and a few others (for various reasons, including overlap with other series), we use 51 variables
from their dataset, 26 for the U.S. and 25 for the E.A.2 For the U.K., we obtained comparable
data on 16 variables from Haver Analytics. Table 2 lists the variables.
This specification reflects some choice as to what constitutes a “macroeconomic” variable
for the purpose of measuring uncertainty and its e↵ects. Common large datasets used in factor
model or FAVAR analysis include a number of indicators — of stock prices, interest rates, and
exchange rates — that may be considered financial indicators. In our model specification, the
variables that might be considered more financial than macroeconomic are the bond yields and
aggregate stock returns. [Short-term interest rates — the instruments of monetary policy —
seem to be appropriately treated as macroeconomic variables.] In our baseline specification, we
follow the precedents of Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) and Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2019)
in including selected bond yields and aggregate stock returns in a macroeconomic model. We
have verified that the main results presented below are robust to dropping the bond yields and
stock returns from the estimation.
In the applications using both datasets, we follow common practice in the factor model
literature and transform each data series for stationarity as needed. With the GDP dataset, we
use quarter-on-quarter growth rates computed as log di↵erences. With the 3-economy dataset, we
use similar transformations as appropriate; Appendix Table 1 lists any transformations used to
achieve stationarity of these data. We also follow common practice in the factor model literature
as well as as Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) and Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018) by
standardizing the data (demean and divide by the simple standard deviation) before estimating
the model. Note that, although the model is estimated with standardized data, for comparability
to previous studies the impulse responses are scaled and transformed back to the units typical
in the literature.3 The fact that the models are estimated using some variables di↵erenced for
stationarity (e.g., GDP, consumption, and investment) implies that, for some of these variables,
the long-run e↵ects of uncertainty shocks on their levels will not entirely die out.
2More specifically, of the variables used by Jarocinski and Mackowiak (2017), we omit: series missing data
early in our sample (stock market volatility, bond spreads, and house prices); other private credit-related measures
(loans to NFCs, lending rate to NFCs, and mortgage interest rate); narrower measures of the money supply (M1
for the U.S. and M1 and M2 for the E.A.); and some additional variables that rank poorly in their causal priority
results (exchange rates and government debt).
3We do so by using the model estimates to: (1) obtain impulse responses in standardized, sometimes (i.e., for
some variables) di↵erenced data; (2) multiply the impulse responses for each variable by the standard deviations
used in standardizing the data before model estimation; and (3) accumulate the impulse responses of step (2) as
appropriate to get back impulse responses in levels or log levels.
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The time samples used in estimation reflect data availability, any transformations used for
stationarity, and considerations of sample stability. In the baseline estimates with the 19-country
GDP dataset, the sample is 1985:Q1-2016:Q3. In this case, although the available data permit
a longer sample, we use a 1985 start to reduce the chances that changes in policies or other
structural forces of economies more likely over a longer sample induce parameter instabilities
(section 6 of the supplemental appendix summarizes a check of robustness in an estimation
sample starting in 1960). In estimates with the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset, the sample
is 1985:Q4-2013:Q3, reflecting the span of the Jarocinski-Mackowiak dataset.
4 Commonality in International Uncertainty
To assess the global factor structure of macroeconomic uncertainty, we apply to estimates of
the stochastic volatilities of BVARs the basic factor model diagnostics surveyed and used in
applications by Stock and Watson (2016). The volatility estimates are posterior medians of
log stochastic volatilities obtained from conventional BVARs with stochastic volatility (denoted
BVAR-SV; due to space restrictions, the by-now familiar model is provided in the appendix’s
section 3.2 and not the text).4 We consider the marginal R2 of volatility factors estimated by
principal components and the Ahn and Horenstein (2013) eigenvalue ratio.
For GDP growth in 19 countries, the measures of factor structure suggest one strong factor in
the international volatility of the business cycle. The first factor accounts for an average of about
79 percent of the variation in log volatilities (see Appendix Table 2 for detailed estimates). The
second and third factors account for about 11 and 6 percent, respectively. The Ahn-Horenstein
ratio peaks at one factor with a value of 7.4, compared to 1.7 and 3.0 for the second and third
factors, respectively. As reported in Table 1, the factor loadings associated with the principal
components are fairly tightly clustered around 1, with a minimum of 0.751 for Denmark and
a maximum of 1.114 for Sweden. In this sense the common volatility factor puts comparable
weight on each country’s volatility.
For the larger set of macroeconomic indicators for the U.S., E.A, and U.K., we use volatility
estimates from BVAR-SV models fit for each economy to assess the commonality in volatility.5
Figure 1 compares volatility estimates across these three economies for a subset of major macroe-
4In this model, the VAR’s innovation vector takes the form vt = A 1⇤0.5t ✏t, with the diagonal matrix ⇤t
containing the stochastic volatilities, and the reduced-form error variance matrix is ⌃t = A 1⇤tA 10. Our
reported results are based on 5,000 draws, obtained by sampling a total of 30,000 draws, discarding the first
5,000, and retaining every 5th draw of the post-burn sample.
5We estimate the model separately for each country rather than as one single system to avoid an unduly
informative proper prior on the log volatility innovation variance matrix  .
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conomic indicators (we use a subset to limit the number of charts). In this comparison, volatility
is reported in the way common in the literature, as the (posterior median of the) standard
deviation of the reduced-form innovation in the BVAR. Qualitatively, these estimates suggest
considerable commonality within and across countries. As the chart indicates, for a given coun-
try, there is significant comovement across variables. For example, for the U.S., most variables
display a rise in volatility around the recessions of the early 1990s, 2001, and 2007-2009. For
the E.A., most variables display sizable increases in uncertainty in the early and mid-1990s and
again with the Great Recession. In addition, there appears to be significant comovement across
economies, somewhat more so for volatility in the U.S. and E.A. than in the case of the U.K.
In the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset, a first factor accounts for an average of about 42
percent of the variation in log volatilities (see Appendix Table 2 for details). The role of the
first factor in volatility is much stronger in this dataset (and in the 19-country GDP dataset)
than in the monthly U.S. data of Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015). For most variables, the
estimated loadings on this factor reported in Table 2 are clustered around a value of 1. For
example, the loadings on GDP growth are 1.330 for the U.S., 1.288 for the E.A., and 1.188 for
the U.K. In this sense the common volatility factor puts comparable (but not equal) weight on the
volatility of most variables in the model. Overall, the patterns in the estimated loadings appear
consistent with an interpretation in which the first factor is capturing a common component in
macroeconomic volatilities, with most loadings clustered around values of 1, most prominently
for the U.S. variables, almost as clearly for the E.A., and with modestly more dispersion in
loadings on the U.K. variables. A second factor accounts for about 26 percent of the variation in
international macroeconomic volatility. Together, two factors account for more than 68 percent
of the variation in volatility across indicators and countries. Subsequent factors account for
significantly smaller marginal shares of variation. The Ahn-Horenstein ratio peaks at two factors.
Together, the R2 and Ahn-Horenstein estimates suggest two factors in this larger dataset.
The detected substantial commonality in volatilities is broadly in line with the empirical
evidence of Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017), as well as the prediction of their DSGE model, in
which commonality is driven by cross-country risk sharing, globalization, and trade openness.
5 Measuring the Impact of Uncertainty
Having established evidence of common factors in international macroeconomic volatilities, we
now turn to assessing the e↵ects of global uncertainty on macroeconomic fluctuations. This
section begins by detailing the Bayesian VAR with a generalized factor structure — henceforth
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referred to as a BVAR-GFSV model — we use for that purpose, first for a one-factor model
applied to the 19-country GDP dataset and then for a two-factor specification applied to the
3-economy macroeconomic dataset.6 We then present results for the uncertainty estimates and
e↵ects of shocks to uncertainty.
5.1 One-Factor BVAR-GFSV Model
With the evidence in the previous section pointing to one factor in the 19-country GDP dataset,
we rely on a one-factor model in our baseline results for the dataset.
Let yt denote the n ⇥ 1 vector of variables of interest — covering multiple countries. The
n⇥ 1 vector of reduced-form shocks to these variables is:
vt = A
 1⇤0.5t ✏t, ✏t ⇠ iid N(0, I), (1)
where A is an n⇥n lower triangular matrix with ones on the main diagonal, and ⇤t is a diagonal
matrix of volatilities,  i,t, i = 1, . . . , n. For each variable i, its log-volatility follows a linear factor
model with a common uncertainty factor lnmt that follows an AR(pm) process augmented to
include yt 1 and an idiosyncratic component ln hi,t that follows an AR(1) process:
ln i,t =  m,i lnmt + lnhi,t, i = 1, . . . , n (2)
lnmt =
pmX
i=1
 m,i lnmt i +  0m,yyt 1 + um,t, um,t ⇠ iid N(0, m) (3)
lnhi,t =  i,0 +  i,1 lnhi,t 1 + ei,t, i = 1, . . . , n. (4)
The volatility factor mt is our measure of (unobservable) global macroeconomic uncertainty. The
idiosyncratic component hi,t captures time variation in a country’s GDP volatility unique to that
country. The uncertainty shock um,t is independent of the conditional errors ✏t and the vector
of volatility innovations ⌫t = (e1,t, . . . , en,t)0, which is jointly distributed as iid N(0, ⌫) with
elements independent among themselves, so that  ⌫ = diag( 1, . . . , n). For identification, we
follow common practice in the dynamic factor model literature and assume lnmt to have a zero
unconditional mean, fix the variance  m at 0.03, and use a simple accept-reject step to restrict
the first variable’s (U.S. GDP growth) loading to be positive.
The global uncertainty measure mt can also a↵ect the levels of the macroeconomic variables
6In light of space restrictions, we refer the reader to the supplemental appendix’s sections 2 and 3.1 and
Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino 2018 for details of the Gibbs sampler and priors used to estimate the model.
Our reported results are based on 5,000 draws, obtained by sampling a total of 30,000 draws, discarding the first
5,000, and retaining every 5th draw of the post-burn sample.
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contained in yt, contemporaneously and with lags. In particular, yt is assumed to follow:
yt =
pX
i=1
⇧iyt i +
pmX
i=0
⇧m,i lnmt i + vt, (5)
where p denotes the number of yt lags in the VAR, pm denotes the number of lnmt lags in
the conditional mean of the VAR (for computational convenience, set to the lag order of the
factor process), ⇧i is an n ⇥ n matrix, i = 1, . . . , p, and ⇧m,i is an n ⇥ 1 vector of coe cients,
i = 0, . . . , pm.
This model allows the international business cycle to respond to movements in global uncer-
tainty, both through the conditional variances (contemporaneously, via movements in vt) and
through the conditional means (contemporaneously and with lag), via the coe cients collected
in ⇧m,i, i = 0, . . . , pm. In our implementation, we set the model’s lag orders at p = 2 and pm
= 2. Note that yt cannot contemporaneously a↵ect uncertainty, which in this sense is treated
as exogenous. (However, it is not entirely exogenous: The model allows uncertainty to respond
with a lag to macroeconomic conditions. We return to endogeneity questions after presenting
the two-factor model next.)
5.2 Two-Factor BVAR-GFSV Model
With Section 4’s principal component-based analysis of volatilities obtained from BVAR-SV
estimates pointing to two factors in the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset, we also consider
specifications with two common volatility components. The natural starting point would be the
model described above extended to include a second factor in both the volatility process and the
VAR’s conditional mean. In unreported estimates, we considered such a model. The estimate of
the first factor in this unrestricted two-factor specification was very similar to the estimate ob-
tained from a one-factor specification and strongly correlated with the first principal component
of BVAR-SV volatilities. The estimated second factor seemed to capture a modest low-frequency
decline in volatility from the first half of the sample to the second half, with generally insignifi-
cant e↵ects on the levels of the variables. However, these results from an unrestricted two-factor
specification appear to su↵er problems with the convergence of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) sampler with this dataset (although not with other datasets).
From this analysis, we conclude that although there are two volatility or uncertainty factors in
the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset, only one bears on the levels of macroeconomic variables.
As we describe in more detail in the robustness section below, we obtained a qualitatively similar
result with an alternative simple approach of adding to the macroeconomic BVAR the principal
components of the BVAR-SV volatilities used in this section.
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Accordingly, for the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset, our baseline results use a two-factor
model with some restrictions. In particular, the model features two common factors in volatilities
but includes only one of the factors in the conditional mean of the VAR and a↵ecting the levels
of the included variables. In addition, reflecting other evidence, the idiosyncratic component of
volatility is simply a constant. With the larger set of indicators for the U.S., E.A., and U.K. in
our sample of quarterly data starting in 1985, unreported estimates of a version of the model
with an AR(1) process for the idiosyncratic component of volatility — a specification that yields
results very similar to those we report — display very little time variation in the idiosyncratic
components. For the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset, our model estimates attribute the vast
majority of time variation in volatility to the common component mt.
With these restrictions, the model applied to the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset takes
the following form, including two international uncertainty factors mt and ft:
yt =
pX
i=1
⇧iyt i +
pmX
i=0
⇧m,i lnmt i + vt (6)
vt = A
 1⇤0.5t ✏t, ✏t ⇠ iid N(0, I) (7)
ln i,t =  m,i lnmt +  f,i ln ft + lnhi, i = 1, . . . , n (8)
lnmt =
pmX
i=1
 m,i lnmt i +  0m,yyt 1 + um,t, um,t ⇠ iid N(0, m) (9)
ln ft =
pfX
i=1
 f,i ln ft i +  0f,yyt 1 + uf,t, uf,t ⇠ iid N(0, f ). (10)
In this case, the log-volatility of each variable i follows a linear factor model with common unob-
servable uncertainty factors lnmt and ln ft, which follow independent AR processes augmented
to include yt 1, and a constant idiosyncratic component lnhi. The volatility factors mt and ft
are measures of (unobservable) global macroeconomic uncertainty. However, only the first global
uncertainty measure, mt, enters the conditional mean of the VAR and a↵ects the levels of the
macroeconomic variables contained in yt, contemporaneously and with lags. The time-invariant
idiosyncratic component captures di↵erences in the average level of volatility across economies.
To spell out the notation, which follows that used in the one-factor model above, A is an n⇥n
lower triangular matrix with ones on the main diagonal; ⇤t is a diagonal matrix of volatilities,
 i,t, i = 1, . . . , n; p denotes the number of yt lags in the VAR; pm denotes the number of lnmt
lags in the conditional mean of the VAR; ⇧i is an n ⇥ n matrix, i = 1, . . . , p; and ⇧m,i is an
n⇥ 1 vector of coe cients, i = 0, . . . , pm. The uncertainty shocks um,t and uf,t are independent
of each other and independent of the conditional errors ✏t. For identification, we assume that
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lnmt and ln ft have zero unconditional means, fix their variances  m and  f at 0.03, and use a
simple accept-reject step to restrict the first factor’s loading on U.S. GDP growth and the second
factor’s loading on E.A. GDP growth to be positive. In our implementation, we set the model’s
lag orders at p = 2, pm = 2, and pf = 2.
In results omitted in the interest of brevity, we have obtained similar findings with some other
modifications of this two-factor model. In one robustness check, we extended the factor process of
equations (9) and (10) to allow VAR dynamics rather than AR dynamics in the factors and allow
a non-zero correlation between the innovations to the factors. We also considered specifications
with up to three factors in volatilities linked to various combinations of the three economies.
These estimates continued to point to two common factors, with only one having conditional
mean e↵ects — similar to those reported — and with factors similar to those reported. Both the
simple factor evidence of section 4 and various specifications of the BVAR-GFSV model point
to the data being consistent with just two uncertainty factors.
5.2.1 Rationale for some choices in the baseline model
Before moving on to empirical results, we take up five specific questions related to our choice
of a baseline model. First, in light of the specification of Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017) that
features global, regional, and country factors in volatility, why not add such factors to our model?
Basically, the data we use — di↵erent in coverage from the data of Mumtaz and Theodoridis
(2017) that do support more factors — don’t seem to warrant it. As the simple factor analysis
of section 4 indicates, and as we will discuss with results for our BVAR-GFSV specifications, the
evidence points to two factors and not more. For example, once we allow for two factors in the
three-economy dataset, there isn’t any meaningful time variation in idiosyncratic components
(so, as noted above, we modify the model of our previous paper to treat them as constant).
Second, why specify a VAR structure for the levels of data and a factor model in the volatilities
of their innovations? Admittedly, along various dimensions, VARs and factor models can both
provide e↵ective representations of the data. For variable sets of the size we consider, our
estimation method can accommodate a VAR in the levels of the data, and we prefer a VAR over
a factor model in order to impose fewer restrictions on dynamics. In the case of the volatilities
and uncertainty, given our treatment of macroeconomic uncertainty as aggregate or common
uncertainty, it is more natural to measure it as a common factor in volatilities (as others in
the literature, such as Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng 2015, have done). Moreover, the empirical
evidence of factor structure is somewhat stronger in volatilities than in the levels of the data. For
example, in the 19-country GDP dataset, the first principal component accounts for 30 percent
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of variation in GDP growth rates but 79 percent of variation in GDP volatility (as measured in
section 4’s BVAR-SV results).
Third, why not include idiosyncratic volatility terms in the VAR’s conditional mean? One
reason is that our analysis (following most of the literature, such as Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng
2015) focuses on common, aggregate uncertainty. Another, noted above, is that once we allow
for two factors, no meaningful variation in idiosyncratic components remains.
Fourth, is the relationship between economic conditions and uncertainty allowed in the model
important? Let’s start with the response of uncertainty to economic conditions as captured by
the coe cient vectors  m,y and  f,y of the uncertainty factor processes of equations (9) and (10).
In additional estimates we produced for 3-economy macroeconomic dataset, when the model is
restricted to make  m,y and  f,y equal 0, the estimates of uncertainty are considerably smoother
than in the paper’s baseline, the responses of the E.A. and U.K. variables to the uncertainty
shock are attenuated, and those of the policy interest rates switch sign. As to the response of
economic conditions to uncertainty, captured by the ⇧m,i coe cients in the VAR’s conditional
mean (equation (6)), these estimates are generally statistically significantly di↵erent from zero,
in line with the significant impulse responses we will report in the next section. Although the
estimates of uncertainty from the restricted model (here, too, we conducted the check with the
3-economy model) are qualitatively similar to those in the unrestricted model of the paper’s
baseline, the restricted estimate of macroeconomic uncertainty shows less of a rise around the
U.S. recessions of the late 1990s and 2001 than does the baseline estimate. Putting these results
together, along both of these dimensions of the model’s parameterizations, there appears to be
substantial evidence of feedback e↵ects between economic conditions and uncertainty.
Finally, why not allow uncertainty to react contemporaneously to economic conditions? As
noted above, the BVAR-GFSV model allows macroeconomic uncertainty to respond to economic
conditions, but with a lag (yt 1 enters the factor processes (9) and (10)). In larger models
that have some advantages for the measurement of uncertainty in internally consistent one-step
approaches, there does not exist an approach that allows contemporaneous feedback between
uncertainty and economic conditions. Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2019) and Ludvigson,
Ma, and Ng (2019) develop approaches that do allow such feedback, but in smaller models that
take the uncertainty measure as given and are not readily extended to large datasets such as the
one we use. Importantly, for the U.S., Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2019), find little evidence
of contemporaneous e↵ects of economic conditions on macroeconomic uncertainty; their results
provide support for a specification like this paper’s in which the economy responds quickly to
macroeconomic uncertainty and uncertainty responds to economic conditions with a delay.
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5.3 BVAR-GFSV Estimates of Uncertainty
Although the BVAR-GFSV estimates of uncertainty reflect influence from the first moments of
macroeconomic data, the estimates are also directly related to the loadings on the common factor
in volatility. These loadings (for the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset, we report only the first
factor’s loadings for brevity) are reported in the last columns of Tables 1 and 2. In the case of
the 19-country GDP dataset, the loadings are broadly centered around 1, with a minimum of
0.396 for Sweden and maximum of 1.634 for Germany. In this respect, the loadings estimated
from the BVAR-GFSV model are similar to those estimated by principal components applied to
log volatilities of the BVAR-SV model. In the case of the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset,
most of the variables have sizable loadings on the volatility factor (keeping in mind that the
scale of the loadings reflects the normalization imposed by fixing the innovation variance for
identification). Across variables, the average of the loading estimates (posterior means) is 0.75,
with a range of 0.12 to 1.50; more than 3/4 of the loadings are above 0.5.
Figure 2 displays the posterior distribution of the measures of uncertainty obtained from the
BVAR-GFSV specification, along with corresponding measures obtained from the first principal
component of the log volatilities from the BVAR-SV models. The top panel provides estimates
for the 19-country GDP dataset, and the bottom panel reports estimates for the 3-economy
macroeconomic dataset. In reporting the BVAR-GFSV estimates, we define uncertainty as the
square root of the common volatility factor (
p
mt), corresponding to a standard deviation. Figure
2 also reports the 15%-85% credible set bands around our estimated measure of uncertainty,
which is correctly considered a random variable in our approach. In the case of the first principal
component of BVAR-SV log volatilities, for scale comparability we exponentiate the principal
component and then compute (and plot) its square root.
As indicated in Figure 2, the uncertainty factors show significant increases around some
of the political and economic events that Bloom (2009) highlights as periods of uncertainty,
including the first Gulf war, 9/11, the Enron scandal, the second Gulf war, and the recent
financial crisis period. In some cases, increases in uncertainty around such events seem to be
defined somewhat more clearly in our larger variable set (bottom panel) than in the GDP-
only dataset for 19 countries. But in both cases, the credible sets around the BVAR-GFSV
estimates indicate that the uncertainty around uncertainty estimates is sizable. Although we
believe it to be important to take account of such uncertainty around uncertainty measures, the
estimates obtained with our BVAR-GFSV model are significantly correlated with those obtained
from the principal component of the BVAR-SV volatility estimates, more so in the 3-economy
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macroeconomic dataset (correlation of 0.800) than in the 19-country GDP dataset (correlation of
0.641). In results omitted in the interest of brevity, with the larger variable set we obtained similar
estimates of common factor volatility (and reduced-form volatilities of the model’s variables) in
a version of the model extended to treat the idiosyncratic components as time-varying. As noted
above, in the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset, essentially all of the time variation in volatilities
appears to be due to common international components and not to components operating at a
country or variable level.
Figure 3 compares our uncertainty estimates to each other and to other estimates in the
literature, including CCM macro and financial uncertainty from Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino
(2018); JLN macro and financial uncertainty from Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015); global
economic policy uncertainty (EPU) from Davis (2016); common uncertainty from Mumtaz and
Theodoridis (2017); and common uncertainty from Berger, Grabert, and Kempa (2016).7 As
indicated in the top left panel, even though our 3-economy macroeconomic and 19-economy GDP
datasets di↵er significantly in composition, estimates of uncertainty obtained with our BVAR-
GFSV model are quite similar, with a correlation of 0.794. The estimate from our 3-economy
dataset is also significantly correlated with the estimate of U.S. macroeconomic uncertainty
from Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018) and to a slightly lesser extent with the Jurado,
Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) estimate of U.S. macroeconomic uncertainty. This suggests that global
macroeconomic uncertainty is closely related to uncertainty in the U.S., which might not seem
surprising given the tie of the international economy to the U.S. economy. On the other hand, we
have noted that most variables have significant loadings on the international uncertainty factors.
So by this very simple measure, the uncertainty we capture is global and not specific to the U.S.
To shed further light on the relationship between U.S. and global uncertainty, we have con-
ducted some additional checks. Specifically, we have compared the 3-economy factor estimate of
macroeconomic uncertainty mt from the paper’s baseline to country-specific estimates. We ob-
tained the country-specific measures by estimating the one-factor BVAR-GFSV model separately
for the U.S., E.A., and U.K. According to these estimates, each of the country-specific factors is
significantly correlated with our estimated international factor, with correlations ranging from
0.6 for the U.K. to 0.8 for the U.S. and E.A. We then regress the baseline estimate of mt on
various combinations of the country-specific estimates. In a regression of our baseline estimate on
all three economy-specific uncertainty measures, the null that the E.A. and U.K. country-specific
factors have zero coe cients is overwhelmingly rejected. These regression results indicate that
7The underlying CCM and JLN estimates are obtained with monthly data and pertain to a one-month ahead
horizon. We use quarterly averages of these estimates.
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our international factor is not just a U.S. factor.
Our estimate of global macroeconomic uncertainty appears to be modestly correlated with
estimates of financial uncertainty from the literature and the global economic policy uncertainty
measure of Davis (2016). Our estimate of global macroeconomic uncertainty is also only modestly
correlated with the uncertainty measures of Berger, Grabert, and Kempa (2016) and Mumtaz
and Theodoridis (2017), both of which display relatively sharp spikes with the Great Recession.
Although the number of di↵erences across specifications makes it di cult to identify which factor
might account for the di↵erences in uncertainty estimates, one probably important di↵erence is
that our uncertainty measure is a common factor in macroeconomic volatilities, whereas in these
papers uncertainty is the volatility of common factors in the business cycle.
A related important empirical issue is whether our estimated uncertainty shocks represent an
original source of business cycle fluctuations or are simply correlated with traditional macroeco-
nomic shocks. To check, we have computed the correlations of our estimated global macroeco-
nomic uncertainty shocks with some well-known and available macro shocks for the U.S., drawing
on comparable exercises in Stock and Watson (2012), Caldara, et al. (2016), and Carriero, Clark,
and Marcellino (2018). These estimates, detailed in (supplemental) Appendix Table 3 in the
interest of brevity, indicate that our international uncertainty shocks are not very correlated
with “known” macroeconomic shocks in the U.S. At least in this sense, to the extent shocks in
the U.S. bear on the international business cycle, our estimated uncertainty shocks seem to truly
represent a second-order “variance” phenomenon, rather than a first-order “level” shock. While
it would be interesting to also assess the correlation of our uncertainty shocks with macroeco-
nomic shocks for other countries or the global economy, we are not aware of standard sources of
shocks like those that exist for U.S. data.
5.4 Measuring the Impact of Uncertainty: Impulse Response Esti-
mates and Historical Decompositions from BVAR-GFSV Model
Figures 4 and 5 provide the BVAR-GFSV estimates of impulse response functions for a shock
to international macroeconomic uncertainty. Starting with the 19-country results in Figure
4, an international shock to macroeconomic uncertainty slowly dies out over several quarters.
The rise in uncertainty induces statistically significant, persistent declines in GDP in most of
the countries, in line with the association found in Ramey and Ramey (1995).8 For example,
8Written with the idea that volatility corresponds to uncertainty, Ramey and Ramey (1995) use simple
comparisons of cross-country averages and panel regressions to show that countries with higher volatility have
lower growth, in both an OECD sample and a large sample of countries. Adding common control variables
strengthens the estimated negative relationship.
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after several quarters, GDP falls about 0.4 percentage point in countries including the U.S.,
Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the U.K. In general, the magnitudes of the declines are
comparable across most countries, although a little less severe in some (e.g., Australia) and
more severe in others (e.g., Finland and Sweden). Castelnuovo and Tran (2017) obtain a similar
finding of larger uncertainty e↵ects in some countries relative to others. Possible reasons could
relate to recessions or the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on monetary policy: In some
research, uncertainty shocks have larger e↵ects during recessions (e.g., Caggiano, Castelnuovo,
Groshenny 2014 and Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Figueres 2019) or in the presence of the ZLB
(e.g., Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino 2017), and Australia faced neither a recession nor
the ZLB in the 2007-2009 period.
For space savings and readability, Figure 5 covers a subset of variables in providing impulse
response estimates for the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset, and it reports posterior medians
and 70 percent credible sets for the U.S. responses but just posterior medians for the E.A. and
U.K. (Appendix Figure 1 provides complete estimates.) In the estimates for this dataset, it is
also the case that an international shock to macroeconomic uncertainty (to the factor lnmt in the
VAR’s conditional mean) gradually dies out over a few quarters. For the U.S., E.A., and U.K,
the heightened international uncertainty reduces GDP and components including investment,
exports, and imports. In all three economies, employment (see Appendix Figure 1) falls and
unemployment rises, and some other measures of economic activity, including confidence or
sentiment indicators and capacity utilization, also fall. The shock does not have any consistently
significant and negative e↵ects on producer or consumer prices, although there are some e↵ects,
such as in the case of the fall in producer prices in the E.A. Although stock prices fall in all three
economies, the policy rate falls in the U.S. but is little changed in the E.A. or U.K. In some cases
— e.g., for GDP — as measured by posterior medians the response of a given variable for the
U.S. is larger than the responses for the E.A. and U.K. But this does not apply to all variables
— e.g., exports and stock prices.
In general qualitative terms, these results line up with those obtained with monthly data for
the U.S. in Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018), with the exception of stock prices, which in
our previous paper were essentially unchanged in response to a macro uncertainty shock but fell
in response to a shock to financial uncertainty. For the sake of conciseness, we refer to Carriero,
Clark, and Marcellino (2018) for references to economic models that can explain response patterns
similar to these. Our empirical results are also in line with those of most of the studies reviewed
in Section 2 and based on di↵erent methodologies, for example, Fernandez-Villaverde, et al.
(2011), Berger, Grabert, and Kempa (2016), or Casarin, et al. (2018). That said, as far as we
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are aware, more research is needed to better understand how changes in economic uncertainty
a↵ect one major economy more than another.
Although these impulse responses show that shocks to uncertainty have significant e↵ects,
they cannot provide an assessment of the broader cyclical importance of global macroeconomic
uncertainty shocks. For that broader assessment, we estimate historical decompositions. In a
standard linear model, a historical decomposition of the total s-step-ahead prediction error vari-
ance of yt+s can be easily obtained by constructing a baseline path (forecast) without shocks,
and then constructing the contribution of shocks. With linearity, the sums of the shock contri-
butions and the baseline path equal the data. In our case, the usual decomposition cannot be
directly applied because of interactions between ⇤t+s and ✏t+s: Shocks to log uncertainty a↵ect
the forecast errors through ⇤t+s✏t+s, and, over time, shocks ✏t+s a↵ect ⇤t+s through the response
of uncertainty to lagged y. However, as developed in Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018),
it is possible to decompose the total contribution of the shocks into three parts: (i) the direct
contributions of the uncertainty shocks ut+s to the evolution of y; (ii) the direct contributions
of the VAR “structural” shocks ✏t+s to the path of y, taking account of movements in ⌃t+s that
arise as uncertainty responds to y but abstracting from movements in ⌃t+s due to uncertainty
shocks; and (iii) the interaction between shocks to uncertainty and the structural shocks ✏t+s.
The supplemental appendix’s section 4 details the basis of the decomposition.
Figures 6 (19-country GDP dataset) and 7 (3-economy macroeconomic dataset) show the
standardized data series, a baseline path corresponding to the unconditional forecast, the direct
contributions of shocks to macroeconomic uncertainty, and the direct contributions of the VAR’s
shocks. The reported estimates are posterior medians of decompositions computed for each draw
from the posterior. To save space, the charts provide results for a subset of selected variables.
Finally, the decomposition results start in 1987:Q1 for the 19-country GDP dataset and, for
better readability, 1998:Q1 for the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset.
As indicated in Figure 6’s decomposition estimates for the 19-country GDP dataset, while
shocks to uncertainty can have noticeable e↵ects on GDP growth in many countries, on balance
they are not a primary driver of fluctuations in growth. For example, over the period of the
Great Recession and subsequent recovery, shocks to uncertainty made modest contributions to
the paths of GDP growth in many (e.g., U.S., France, Spain, and Sweden) and small contributions
in some countries (e.g., Japan and Norway). In the declines of GDP growth observed in a number
of countries in the early 1990s and early 2000s, uncertainty shocks made small contributions in
some countries (e.g., U.S., Sweden, and U.K.). Overall, shocks to the VAR’s variables played a
much larger role than did uncertainty shocks. However, there is a sense in which that is a natural
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result of considering the VAR shocks jointly as a set versus the uncertainty shock; individually,
some or many of the VAR shocks would also play small or modest roles.
Figure 7’s decomposition estimates for the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset paint a broadly
similar picture. For example, around the Great Recession (2007-2009 for the U.S.), shocks
to macroeconomic uncertainty (the first factor lnmt) contribute somewhat to fluctuations in
economic activity, including in GDP, business investment, and housing investment, but not much
to inflation or stock prices. Similar patterns are evident in the decline in GDP growth observed in
the early 2000s. With this dataset, too, the e↵ects of uncertainty shocks are generally dominated
by the contributions of the VAR’s shocks. Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018) obtain a
broadly similar result, as does Benati (2016) with a di↵erent approach.
The responses of GDP growth for the U.S., U.K., and some European countries obtained with
the GDP-only dataset are larger and more persistent than those resulting from the 3-country
multi-variable dataset. Similarly, the contributions of uncertainty shocks to GDP growth are
slightly larger with the former dataset than with the latter, in particular during the 2007-2009
recession period. While there is substantial uncertainty about responses and contributions, this
result might be due to variable omission (reduced conditioning information) when working with
the GDP-only dataset. Results on the e↵ects of uncertainty shocks on the U.S. GDP growth are
also di↵erent in bivariate and multivariate models in Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2019).
To put the importance of uncertainty shocks in broader perspective, it may help to compare
their e↵ects to those of U.S. monetary policy shocks, which have been extensively studied. While
space constraints preclude a detailed analysis in the paper, we have considered estimates of policy
shock e↵ects in the literature and in some checks with our own data. These comparisons indicate
that some aspects of the e↵ects of uncertainty shocks resemble those of U.S. policy shocks, in
both directions of responses and quantitative importance. For example, a surprise increase in
uncertainty significantly reduces economic activity and stock prices. The e↵ects of an uncertainty
shock di↵er from the e↵ects of a policy shock in that the former does not consistently produce
a fall in prices (however, recall that a fall in prices results from a policy shock at least partly by
definition of a policy shock identified by sign restrictions) or foreign interest rates. As measured
by variance contributions, in qualitative terms the importance of an international uncertainty
shock resembles that of a monetary policy shock: at medium horizons, the contributions are
small (for some economic activity measures, the contributions are modest at short horizons).
For example, at an 8-quarter ahead horizon, our estimates put the forecast error variance shares
of a shock to global uncertainty at about 5 percent for U.S. GDP, less than 3 percent for E.A.
and U.K. GDP, and less than 2 percent for stock prices and short-term interest rates.
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6 Robustness
In the first of a few robustness checks, we compare our BVAR-GFSV estimates of impulse
responses to estimates from a two-step approach similar to those used in a number of uncertainty
analyses, such as Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) and Berger, Grabert, and Kempa (2016).9
In the first step of the two-step approach, we obtained a measure of uncertainty as the first
principal component of log volatilities (posterior medians of ln i,t) estimated with the BVAR-
SV specification. In the second step, we added this uncertainty measure to a homoskedastic
BVAR in the 67 variables of the larger dataset — hence yielding a 68-variable BVAR — and
performed standard structural analysis, ordering the uncertainty measure first in the system.10
In the supplement, Appendix Figure 2 compares the two-step and BVAR-GFSV estimates.
Qualitatively, the impulse responses obtained from the two-step approach are similar to those
obtained with our BVAR-GFSV model. In the two-step estimates, as in our BVAR-GFSV results,
an international shock to macroeconomic uncertainty gradually dies out over several quarters.
The heightened uncertainty reduces GDP and many of its components, including investment,
exports, and imports, in the U.S., E.A., and U.K. (although, for the U.K., the responses of
exports and imports are smaller in the two-step approach). Other components of spending (e.g.,
consumption) are reduced in some economies (U.S. and U.K.) but not others (E.A.). In most
but not all economies, employment falls and unemployment rises, and some other measures of
economic activity, including confidence or sentiment indicators and capacity utilization, also fall.
In response, stock prices and policy rates move lower in all three economies (in the BVAR-GFSV
estimates, policy rates do not decline uniformly across economies).
While qualitatively similar across the approaches, it is often, although not always, the case
that the magnitudes of responses are smaller in the two-step estimates than in the BVAR-GFSV
results. This is particularly true in the U.S. estimates, but it also applies to some degree for
the E.A. and U.K. For example, in the U.S. results, the declines in GDP, exports, and imports
are smaller (in absolute value) in the two-step estimates than in the BVAR-GFSV estimates. In
the U.K. results, the decline in GDP is similar across the estimates, but the estimated fallo↵ in
exports and imports is not quite as sharp in the two-step estimates as in the baseline estimates.
9In light of possible distortions of estimated policy responses stemming from the binding lower bound con-
straint on short-term interest rates following the most recent global recession, we have also considered a robustness
check of replacing the policy rates with historical time series of shadow rates. In particular, we have estimated
the 3-economy model with the Wu-Xia shadow rate series replacing the short-term interest rates in the baseline
model. The resulting estimates of macroeconomic uncertainty and impulse responses to an uncertainty shock are
essentially the same as those reported in the paper.
10The supplemental appendix’s section 3.3 details the priors for this model. Estimates are based on samples
of 5,000 retained draws, obtained by sampling a total of 6,000 draws and discarding the first 1,000.
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Finally, a key di↵erence is that the confidence bands are wider for the BVAR-GFSV estimates
than for the two-step estimates; as might be expected, by treating the uncertainty measure as
data rather than an estimate, the two-step approach appears to understate uncertainty around
estimates of the e↵ects of shocks to uncertainty.
In results not shown in the interest of brevity, we have also used the two-step approach to
consider the e↵ects of a second volatility or uncertainty factor, by adding the first two principal
components of BVAR-SV volatilities to a homoskedastic BVAR in the macroeconomic variables,
ordering the factors first in the system. These two-step estimates corroborate the di culty of
identifying a second uncertainty factor with e↵ects on the levels of macroeconomic variables. In
the two-step case, the shock to the second principal component reduces some selected measures
of economic activity in the U.S. but does not have broadly significant e↵ects across economies.
In fact, in the U.K. responses, although GDP falls, employment rises and unemployment falls,
contradicting most other evidence on the e↵ects of an uncertainty shock, including our preferred
BVAR-GFSV estimates presented earlier and the estimates of Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015)
and Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018).
We have also used a two-step approach to provide another check on the degree of spillover
in uncertainty from one economy to another. As indicated earlier in the paper, our main results
yield a strong commonality in uncertainty rather than a leading role for the U.S. as a driver
of global uncertainty. As a further check of spillover, we included in a BVAR country-specific
measures of uncertainty obtained by estimating the one-factor BVAR-GFSV model detailed in
the paper’s section 5.1 separately for the U.S., E.A., and U.K. We produced impulse responses to
shocks to these uncertainty measures under di↵erent orderings. In these estimates, the country-
specific uncertainty shocks get transmitted to the other economies and have negative e↵ects
qualitatively similar to those of the global uncertainty shocks. This pattern is broadly similar to
that of Caggiano, Castelnuovo and, Figueres (2019) and Belke and Osowski (2019) for the case of
U.S. economic policy uncertainty shocks. These robustness results are consistent with our main
findings of strong commonality in uncertainty that a↵ects all major economies considered.
Finally, we used a two-step approach to verify the distinction of the global uncertainty mea-
sure from U.S.-specific uncertainty. We specified a BVAR in the 26 U.S. variables of our 3-
economy dataset, the global uncertainty estimate from the 3-economy BVAR-GFSV model, and
the U.S.-specific estimate of uncertainty from Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2018), with U.S.
uncertainty ordered first, global uncertainty second, and the remaining variables following in
the sequence of the baseline model. We then estimated impulse responses for a shock to global
uncertainty and obtained results very similar to those in the baseline results above, with a shock
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to global uncertainty significantly depressing a range of measures of economic activity and stock
prices, with responses comparable to those in the paper. These results support the baseline spec-
ification, in which uncertainty has a global component distinct from U.S.-specific uncertainty. In
these estimates, both global and U.S.-specific uncertainty a↵ect the economy.
7 Conclusions
This paper uses large Bayesian VARs to measure international macroeconomic uncertainty and
its e↵ects, using two datasets, one consisting of GDP growth for 19 industrialized economics and
the other comprised of 67 variables in quarterly data for the U.S., E.A., and U.K. Using basic
factor model diagnostics, we first provide evidence of significant commonality in international
macroeconomic volatility, with one common factor — in each of our datasets — accounting for
strong comovement across economies and variables. We then turn to measuring uncertainty and
its e↵ects with a large, heteroskedastic VAR in which the error volatilities evolve over time ac-
cording to a factor structure. The volatility of each variable in the system reflects time-varying
common (global) components and idiosyncratic components. In this model, global uncertainty
is allowed to contemporaneously a↵ect the macroeconomies of the included nations — both the
levels and volatilities of the included variables. In this setup, uncertainty and its e↵ects are
estimated in a single step within the same model. Our estimates yield new measures of inter-
national macroeconomic uncertainty, and indicate that uncertainty shocks (surprise increases)
lower GDP, as well as many of its components, around the world, adversely a↵ect labor market
conditions, lower stock prices, and in some economies lead to an easing of monetary policy.
Our analysis extends recent work on common international aspects of macroeconomic un-
certainty and its e↵ects in several directions. Our framework allows us to coherently estimate
uncertainty and its e↵ects in one step, rather than rely on a two-step approach common in
the uncertainty literature, in which a measure of uncertainty is estimated in a preliminary step
and then used as if it were observable data in the subsequent econometric analysis (ignoring
time-varying second moments) of its impact on macroeconomic variables. Our approach, unlike
some other analyses in the international uncertainty literature, makes use of large datasets; some
other work in the U.S.-focused literature has emphasized some benefits to using relatively large
cross sections. Finally, whereas some previous work in the international uncertainty literature
has either focused on international components to second moments or possibly confounded first-
moment shocks with second-moment changes, our paper cleanly distinguishes uncertainty as a
second-moment phenomenon that can a↵ect first moments.
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Our results can be seen as providing an empirical basis for further work on structural open-
economy models. As noted in the introduction, Gourio, Siemer, and Verdelhan (2013) develop a
model in which one particular type of uncertainty, associated with disaster risk, leads to a broad
decline in economic activity, more so in an economy more a↵ected by the disaster. Mumtaz and
Theodoridis (2017) develop a model that can explain international comovement in volatilities.
Further work is needed to establish models in which an international shock to risk in the tradition
of closed-economy studies such as Bloom (2009), Basu and Bundick (2017), and Leduc and Liu
(2016) produces global changes in economic activity and other indicators in line with the patterns
documented in this paper.
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Table 1: Factor loadings: 19-country GDP dataset
Country Principal component GFSV loading
loading posterior mean (st. dev.).
U.S. 0.939 0.925 (0.347)
Australia 1.051 0.695 (0.383)
Austria 1.093 1.060 (0.374)
Belgium 0.978 1.390 (0.395)
Canada 1.103 1.004 (0.392)
Denmark 0.751 0.505 (0.446)
Finland 1.062 1.007 (0.333)
France 1.079 0.718 (0.399)
Germany 1.105 1.634 (0.362)
Italy 1.106 1.169 (0.371)
Japan 1.065 0.915 (0.408)
Luxembourg 0.939 0.985 (0.362)
Netherlands 0.889 0.966 (0.396)
Norway 0.780 0.515 (0.395)
Portugal 1.003 1.287 (0.401)
Spain 0.943 1.415 (0.382)
Sweden 1.114 1.065 (0.382)
Switzerland 0.769 0.396 (0.388)
U.K. 1.097 1.130 (0.413)
Note: The second column provides loadings on a first common factor estimated as the
principal component of log volatilities of a BVAR-SV model. The third column provides
estimates of the loadings  m,i of equation (2) of the one-factor BVAR-GFSV model.
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Figure 1: BVAR-SV estimates of volatilities, selected variables. The reported entries are posterior
medians of standard deviations of reduced-form innovations from BVAR-SV models estimated for
each economy.
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Figure 2: Uncertainty estimates for 19-country GDP dataset in the top panel and for 3-economy
macroeconomic dataset in the bottom panel. In each panel, the blue line provides an estimate
obtained from the first principal component of the BVAR-SV estimates of log volatility. The
solid black line and gray-shaded regions provide the posterior median and 15%/85% quantiles of
the BVAR-GFSV estimate of macroeconomic uncertainty (m0.5t ). The periods indicated by black
vertical lines or regions correspond to the uncertainty events highlighted in Bloom (2009). Labels
for these events are indicated in text horizontally centered on the event’s start date.
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Figure 3: Comparison of uncertainty estimates to others in the literature. The top left panel
compares the uncertainty estimate obtained from the 3-economy macroeconomic dataset (black
line) to that obtained with the 19-country GDP dataset (blue line). Other panels compare the
3-economy macroeconomic dataset estimate (black line) to a di↵erent estimate (blue line) from
the literature, normalized to have the same mean and variance as the 3-economy macroeconomic
dataset estimate.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses for international uncertainty shock: one-factor BVAR-GFSV estimates
for 19-country GDP dataset, posterior median (black line) and 15%/85% quantiles
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Figure 5: Impulse responses for international uncertainty shock: two-factor BVAR-GFSV estimates
for 3-economy macroeconomic dataset, selected variables. The black line and gray shading provide
posterior medians and 15%/85% quantiles for the U.S. response. The colored lines provide posterior
medians for the E.A. and U.K. 34
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Figure 6: Historical decompositions: one-factor BVAR-GFSV estimates for 19-country GDP
dataset, selected variables, posterior medians
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Figure 7: Historical decompositions: two-factor BVAR-GFSV estimates for 3-economy macroeco-
nomic dataset, selected variables, posterior medians
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